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Abstract 
This paper develops an innovative slacks-based manager efficiency index (SMEI) to evaluate 
the efficiency of mutual fund managers. First, the SMEI contributes to decisions by evaluating 
the efficiency of the manager as a whole instead of focusing on individual mutual funds. 
Second, the SMEI includes socio-demographic variables to extend the mere consideration of 
financial variables in the model. Third, the SMEI identifies locally efficient but globally 
inefficient managers. This local SMEI evaluates managers in reference to the ‘best practice’ 
competitors with similar management characteristics. Finally, this paper includes a real 
application of the SMEI in a sample of individual managers in the Spanish mutual fund 
industry. This empirical illustration further examines the persistence of the efficiency scores and 
the influence of the SMEI variables on the efficiency of individual managers.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, the financial sector has undergone major changes in its activities due 
to the internationalisation and regulation of financial markets and technological advances, 
among other factors (Álvarez et al., 2016). These changes have forced financial institutions to 
transform their business models to survive in this new competition (Kok et al., 2016). This 
transformation process has implied changes in the efficiency of the financial industry, thereby 
directing the attention of researchers to different financial sectors and institutions. 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA), which was first introduced in Charnes et al. (1978), 
has been widely used in the efficiency evaluation of the financial industry. Cook and Seiford 
(2009) and Liu et al. (2013) conduct an exhaustive review of real-world DEA applications, 
including applications focused on banks, savings banks, loan companies, and the insurance 
sector. One of the more active applications of DEA in finance is mutual fund performance. The 
mutual fund literature is mainly focused on these frontier methods because these methods do not 
require any functional form between return and risk, while the traditional performance measures 
require this functional form. In addition, the potential use of several inputs and outputs by DEA 
models is an innovative way to explore mutual fund performance. That is, DEA models help to 
incorporate additional information that is explicitly used in the decision-making process of 
mutual fund managers. Therefore, DEA may be considered an alternative approach to traditional 
performance measures, such as the methods proposed by Sharpe (1966), Jensen (1968), Fama 
and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). In this sense, Lamb and Tee (2012a) complete the lack 
of some theoretical foundations in this increasing literature that uses DEA to construct return-
risk ratios for mutual funds. 
Murthi et al. (1997) use DEA for the first time to assess mutual fund performance. Their 
metric, called the DEA portfolio efficiency index (DPEI), can be considered an extension of the 
widely known Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966) by including the transactional costs as an additional 
input to the standard deviation of the portfolio returns. In fact, Choi and Murthi (2001) suggest 
that the Sharpe ratio can be considered a constant return to scale DEA model with the standard 
deviation of fund returns as a single input and the excess fund returns as a single output. Since 
then, numerous papers have included extensions and modifications in the set of variables 
included in the DPEI, but the rationale of the metric remains similar. McMullen and Strong 
(1998), Premachandra et al. (1998), Morey and Morey (1999), Basso and Funari (2001, 2003, 
2017), Galagedera and Silvapulle (2002), Haslem and Scheraga (2003), Chang (2004), Daraio 
and Simar (2006), Lozano and Gutiérrez (2008) and Lamb and Tee (2012b) are some examples 
of the increasing DEA literature that evaluates mutual fund performance based on the seminal 
DPEI of Murthi et al. (1997). Furthermore, Premachandra et al. (2012) and Sánchez-González 
et al. (2017) apply network DEA models to decompose the efficiency of mutual fund 
companies. 
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These DPEI extensions have also been extended to evaluate hedge funds due to the 
problems found when using traditional models in the hedge fund world of option-like and non-
normal returns (Fung and Hsieh, 1997; Brealey and Kaplanis, 2001). Gregoriou et al. (2005), 
Eling (2006) and Kumar et al. (2010), among other scholars, use DEA models to overcome 
these return-generating problems when assessing hedge fund performance. DEA models also 
assess pension fund performance (Medeiros, 2010; Andreu et al., 2014) due to the increasing 
interest in the third pillar of pension schemes as a key factor of the outstanding pension reform, 
particularly in EU member states (European Union Parliament, 2014).  
Although these DPEI extensions contribute to the assessment of portfolio performance, 
there is a lack of DEA evidence on the efficiency of portfolio managers. That is, although the 
previous DEA literature mainly focuses on portfolio performance records as a result of the 
investment decisions made by managers, the efficiency of this decision-making process has 
been scarcely analysed through DEA models. Thus, the founding DPEI measure should be 
reformulated to evaluate the efficiency of portfolio managers by including more influential and 
precise variables in a DEA model that can better identify some specific characteristics of 
managers. Our paper develops an innovative model to fill this gap in the literature.  
As far as we know, only the recent study by Banker et al. (2016) evaluates the 
efficiency of mutual fund managers using an additive DEA model to evaluate their buying and 
selling activities relative to the trades of other managers. However, our paper differs from 
Banker et al. (2016) regarding three main questions, thereby contributing to the literature. First, 
our model considers the frequent situation of a manager in charge of several mutual funds. 
Thus, we evaluate the efficiency of the manager as a whole instead of focusing on the results of 
individual mutual funds. Second, our model includes socio-demographic variables that can 
influence the decision-making process of mutual fund managers, thereby highlighting that the 
efficiency of managers is not limited only to a return/risk trade-off. Third, our paper identifies 
locally efficient managers according to the efficient frontiers formed by competitors with 
similar attributes as the analysed target managers. This issue is particularly relevant in the 
mutual fund industries that include managers with varying characteristics. For this purpose, we 
use the slacks-based model (SBM) proposed by Tone (2001) and its further SBM variations 
(Tone, 2010).  
The implications of our model are relevant in different terms. First, our model is 
relevant for mutual fund investors to know which managers are more efficient than other 
managers. Second, our model is also relevant for managers to know their efficiency relative to 
their industry competitors and to attempt to improve their results. Finally, our model provides 
relevant information for mutual fund companies to design and implement compensation and 
promotion systems based on accurate evaluations of their mutual fund managers. These decision 
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support systems could improve the efficiency of the remuneration structure of mutual fund 
companies, thereby increasing the efficiency of the overall mutual fund industry. 
We conduct an empirical application in a set of managers of Euro equity mutual funds 
registered in Spain from January 2009 to December 2016. The choice of this mutual fund 
industry is justified because the variables included in our model show striking differences in the 
Spanish market and may play an important role in the evaluation of mutual fund managers. This 
real-world application also includes the analysis of the main determinants of both a manager’s 
efficiency score and his/her  survival as an individual manager in the industry.    
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes our slacks-based manager 
efficiency index (SMEI) and its local variation. Section 3 shows the empirical application to the 
Spanish mutual fund industry. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. The model 
Our model aims to evaluate the efficiency of managers by extending the rationale 
proposed by the founding DPEI in Murthi et al. (1997). The DPEI measure incorporates 
transaction costs to modify the basic idea considered in the well-known excess return/risk ratio 
of Sharpe (1966). The transaction costs are considered in the DPEI by including the expense 
ratio, portfolio loads and portfolio turnover as additional inputs to the risk that is measured as 
the standard deviation of the return. The DPEI measure is then formulated according to the DEA 
approach of Charnes et al. (1978). This model finds the input weights (ωi, υ) that maximise the 
ratio of the excess return (ERo) to the weighted average of the determinants of the transaction 
costs (xio, i=1,...,3) and the risk (σo) of the target mutual fund, which is denoted by subscript o. 
This maximisation model is subject to the condition that all such ratios of the analysed J funds 
are less than or equal to one. The input weights must be higher than or equal to a positive value 
non-Archimedean infinitesimal (ε) that is smaller than any positive real number. 
∑
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According to the DPEI, investors should search for efficient mutual funds that maximise 
the excess return and minimise both the transaction costs and risk. Lozano and Gutiérrez (2008) 
show that most of the DEA applications to mutual funds use this founding rationale but 
sophisticate the main variables included in the DPEI. 
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Therefore, the challenge in our paper is to adapt the rationale provided by Murthi et al. 
(1997) to a new model to evaluate managers instead of mutual funds. This issue is particularly 
relevant because mutual funds can experience manager replacement; therefore, fund 
performance cannot be attributed to a specific manager (Clare et al., 2014). An analysis at the 
manager level can properly answer whether some managers are better than other managers. In 
addition, we emphasise that the DPEI approach does not consider the interaction among the 
variables of the model in the case of managers who are in charge of several mutual funds. For 
this purpose, our approach overcomes this shortcoming to evaluate manager efficiency in its 
entirety rather than the mere assessment of individual mutual funds. This relevant modification 
to the DPEI must be included in both the inputs and outputs of our new model. 
2.1 The outputs 
According to the previous literature, several measures of return, i.e., gross return, net 
return, excess return, etc., have been selected as the main output in the majority of DEA 
applications to financial portfolios (e.g., Choi and Murthi, 2001; Galagedera and Silvapulle, 
2002; Chang, 2004; Daraio and Simar, 2006; Andreu et al., 2014; Banker et al., 2016; and 
Basso and Funari, 2017). In our manager approach, an efficient manager should maximise the 
returns of all mutual funds of which he/she is in charge. Thus, our model includes the annual 
gross return of manager j as an output variable (RETURNj). This return is computed as the Total 
Net Assets (TNA)-weighted sum of the annual gross return obtained by each individual mutual 
fund within an investment vocation of which manager j is in charge. That is, our model 
considers that a manager may be in charge of more than one fund and investment vocation in a 
given year. Then, the annual gross return of each manager within an investment vocation is 
rescaled following a unity-based normalisation to bring all of the TNA-weighted returns into the 
range of [0,1]. For each investment vocation, this rescaling process subtracts the minimum 
TNA-weighted return from each manager’s TNA-weighted return and divides the result by the 
difference between the maximum and minimum TNA-weighted return that year. Accordingly, 
the rescaling process is conducted for each individual manager in each year of the sample 
period. 1 This normalisation removes the time effects from the analysis and overcomes the 
potential negative values of the annual gross returns that are considered by the model. However, 
the main contribution of this normalisation is to solve the potential bias in the return records of 
managers who are in charge of several mutual funds with different investment vocations. 
Sánchez-González et al. (2017) performs a similar unity-based normalisation to consider the 
different sizes and return patterns of the diverse investment vocations managed by a mutual 
                                                          
1 For an analysis focused on a specific investment vocation, this normalised value should be the excess 
return of manager j (output RETURNj). For a generalised analysis on a wide range of investment 
vocations, these normalised values should be weighted by the money managed by manager j in each 
investment vocation. 
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fund company. We extend this approach to the different investment vocations that are 
potentially covered by a manager. That is, the returns weighted by fund size represent to some 
extent the manager skills, but the different return patterns of the different investment vocations 
might distort the TNA-weighted returns of a manager. For instance, a manager who specialises 
in equity funds might obtain upwards-biased TNA-weighted returns in years with bullish stock 
markets compared with a manager who specialises in bond funds. This annual normalisation 
provides more consistent TNA-weighted return records across the different investment 
vocations covered by a manager.  
Furthermore, we extend the number of outputs of our model with respect to the only 
output, i.e., excess return, included in the original DPEI measure. There is extensive literature 
regarding mutual fund size and performance in DEA applications. For instance, Murthi et al. 
(1997) find some evidence that larger funds may be more efficient than smaller funds, which 
may be explained by lower transactions costs. Recently, Basso and Funari (2017) concluded that 
there is no significant linear correlation between size and performance in a set of European 
equity mutual funds, but large funds, on average, tend to exhibit a slightly higher performance 
score than smaller funds, which indicates the presence of scale economies. Thus, the returns 
obtained by a manager might not be totally independent of the assets under management. 
Consistent with Sánchez-González et al. (2017), efficient managers should maximise the assets 
under management to contribute to the operational efficiency of the mutual fund management 
company. This question is important for the companies where the management fees are largely 
based on the assets under management instead of performance-based fees.2 Specifically, we 
include the total assets under management by manager j (AUMj) as the second output of our 
model. 
2.2 The inputs 
Based on the previously defined outputs, our approach belongs to the models transposed 
from production theory in combination with some traditional financial performance measures. 
Accordingly, our new model is consistent with the rationale that an efficient manager 
maximises the return to the greatest amount of assets under management as possible. However, 
what is the rationale of the input restrictions against this objective? The answer to this question 
is relevant to overcome the interpretation problem addressed by Brandouy et al. (2015) when a 
frontier model combines a traditional financial performance measure and some additional 
variables. That is, what does the efficiency measure mean in such a setting?  
Consistent with the DPEI in Murthi et al. (1997) and according to the literature review 
of Lozano and Gutiérrez (2008), the most common inputs in DEA applications to mutual funds 
are the risk and the management costs. These applications frequently use the standard deviation 
                                                          
2 For instance, Díaz-Mendoza et al. (2014) support this finding for the Spanish mutual fund industry. 
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of returns as a risk input to evaluate the efficiency of mutual funds (e.g., McMullen and Strong, 
1998; Basso and Funari, 2001; Choi and Murthi, 2001; Galagedera and Silvapulle, 2002; Basso 
and Funari, 2003; Chang, 2004; Daraio and Simar, 2006; Premachandra et al., 2012; Sánchez-
González et al., 2017). However, the literature also shows an increasing sophistication in the 
risk measures by considering the first two or three moments of the portfolio returns, i.e., the 
variance-covariance matrix and skewness-coskewness matrix. This sophistication has been 
shown to be particularly relevant in assessing hedge funds (Gregoriou et al., 2005). 
However, some researchers have considered risk to be an undesirable output 
simultaneously produced with return by using directional distance functions and the Luenberger 
shortage function (e.g., Briec and Kerstens, 2009, 2010; Briec et al., 2004, 2007, 2013; Kerstens 
et al., 2011). These papers suggest that treatment of risk as an input is unfortunate because risk 
and return are jointly produced, i.e., risk cannot be anticipated in the return generating process. 
This assumption should consider risk as an undesirable output rather than an input, similar to 
the seminal DPEI model and its subsequent literature. This controversy is a relevant issue to 
determine both the role of risk in our model and the model specification.  
Therefore, the selection of risk as an input instead of an undesirable output in our model 
requires an appropriate justification. This choice is based on the significantly different risk 
levels associated with the different investment vocations that are potentially covered by a 
manager.3 Furthermore, these differences may even be significant within the same investment 
vocation, i.e., value equities may show different risk patterns than growth equities in the 
Eurozone equity investment vocation. Obviously, risk measured as the standard deviation or 
higher moments of the portfolio returns cannot be exactly observed, but a manager may partly 
anticipate the level of risk as a consequence of their investment strategies. For instance, 
investment strategies focused on small capitalisation equities are likely to generate higher levels 
of risk than investment strategies focused on large capitalisation equities. Thus, the level of risk 
assumed by the investment strategy of the manager can be anticipated, which supports the 
literature that claims the choice of risk as an input.4 Consequently, our model should consider as 
an input the overall risk held by a manager in all mutual funds of which he/she is in charge. In 
addition, our approach should consider the positive effects of portfolio diversification in the 
manager risk measure, i.e., the risk of a manager cannot be computed as the linear combination 
of the risk measures of all individual mutual funds for which he/she is in charge. For these 
reasons, we compute the annual level of risk assumed by manager j each year as the square root 
                                                          
3 Morningstar (2017) supports that small capitalisation equities, large capitalisation equities, international 
equities, bonds and cash show consistent and significantly different levels of risk across different time 
horizons from 1970 to 2016.  
4 However, our model specification should consider the particularities where the level of risk cannot be 
anticipated in such a manner. The next section of this paper includes a complementary approach to our 
original model that would consider risk as an undesirable output. 
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of the TNA-weighted sum of the cross products of the annual variances and covariances of the 
daily gross returns of all mutual funds managed by manager j in a given year (RISKj).  
Thus, mutual fund investors should pursue managers who provide high returns, 
assuming a low level of risk. However, there is evidence that the performance of active 
managers depends largely on their efficiency in timing their buy and sell trades (e.g., Chen et 
al., 2000). For this reason, portfolio turnover has been included as an input in the DEA literature 
because it is the main proxy to capture the transaction cost structure in the evaluation of mutual 
and pension funds (e.g., Murthi, 1997, Choi and Murthi, 2001; Daraio and Simar, 2006; Andreu 
et al., 2014). The previous literature has shown that managers who trade more often incur 
higher transaction costs. Specifically, Babalos et al. (2012) conclude that the turnover rate is the 
main source of inefficiency for their sample funds. Therefore, an efficient manager should incur 
the lowest transaction costs to obtain the highest return as possible. Annual mutual fund 
turnover is calculated as the lesser of purchases or sales divided by the average monthly net 
asset value of the fund (Elton et al., 2010). Similar to the other variables in our model, turnover 
is TNA-weighted to consider the fact that manager j is in charge of several funds 
(TURNOVERj).  
In addition to transaction costs, it is also relevant to account for the labour costs that 
companies assume to manage mutual funds. There are very few papers that study the effects of 
manager compensation on mutual fund performance (e.g., Elton et al., 2003; Golec and Starks, 
2004; Agarwal et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2016). These authors find that US managers with 
performance-based compensation systems exhibit superior performance. However, due to the 
lack of information on manager compensation for other less-developed mutual fund industries, 
we incorporate both the education and industry experience of mutual fund managers as a proxy 
for the manager compensation assumed by mutual fund companies. According to the literature 
on education among professionals, education is positively related to higher wages and less 
frequent and shorter periods of unemployment (e.g., Cohen et al., 1997; Riddell and Song, 
2011; OECD, 2014; Andreu and Puetz, 2017). Accordingly, it makes sense that the base salary 
of a mutual fund manager is mainly determined by education and industry experience.5  
The education-experience input is created through a sigmoid function to combine both 
the variable education with the variable industry experience of the manager to obtain a non-
linear proxy of labour costs, as this mathematical function has an S-shaped curve. The sigmoid 
function is widely used in the finance literature as a proxy for learning processes (e.g., Wang 
and Huang, 2010). In our case, we find this function suitable for variables such as education and 
experience because the compensation system associated with these variables does not grow 
linearly. That is, when managers have more (less) industry experience, manager education is 
                                                          
5 The website salary.com confirms this hypothesis for a large sample of US portfolio managers. See more 
details at http://www1.salary.com/Portfolio-Manager-Salary.html. 
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less (more) important in the remuneration system. This hypothesis makes sense because high 
levels of education may signal high job market potential (e.g., Spence, 1973; Weiss, 1983; 
Hvide, 2003), and these education signals are more important when managers’ industry 
experience is short. Thus, the input education-experience of manager j denoted as EEj is 
computed in our model as follows:  
( )jedujj eEE −+= 1exp  when eduj =1;     expj jEE =   when eduj =0 (2) 
where expj is the industry experience of manager j, which is computed in years from the 
first year that Morningstar reports the information for a manager in the database, and eduj is a 
binary variable that represents the level of education of manager j. This binary variable 
discriminates between managers with a master’s degree (edu=1) and managers without a 
master’s degree (edu=0). Therefore, if a manager does not have a master’s degree, the variable 
EEj will take the value of the manager’s experience. 
2.3 The slacks-based manager efficiency index (SMEI) 
According to the previously defined input and output variables, an efficient manager 
should maximise the returns to the greatest assets under management as possible, assuming low 
levels of risk and transaction and labour costs for the mutual fund company. The rationale of 
this approach is relevant from the perspective of a management company because it extends the 
return/risk maximisation problem of mutual fund investors by including both a proxy for the 
manager remuneration paid by the company and the assets under management as a key 
determinant of the management fees earned by the company.6 Thus, our model aims to assess 
manager efficiency as a relevant component of a mutual fund company rather than mere 
individuals (e.g., Premachandra et al., 2012; Sánchez-González et al., 2017). Accordingly, a 
manager who obtained good return records for a large amount of assets, assuming low levels of 
risk and transaction costs but more expense in terms of labour costs for the company, could be 
deemed inefficient if there was a manager who obtained similar returns for the same amount of 
assets and incurred the same risk and transaction costs but lower labour costs. Thus, our model 
could be useful to support the manager remuneration systems defined by mutual fund 
companies.  
We extend the DEA formulation of Charnes et al. (1978) in the founding DPEI by 
integrating the slacks of each input and output individually into an efficiency score. We 
formulate our new efficiency index following the non-radial SBM proposed by Tone (2001). 
The SBM is invariant to the units of measurement because the slacks are divided by the level 
variables so that the units get cancelled, and it monotonically decreases in each input and output 
                                                          
6 The management fees earned by Spanish mutual fund companies are largely based on assets under 
management instead of performance-based fees. For details, see Díaz-Mendoza et al. (2014). 
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slack. The SBM is not translation invariant in the case of negative inputs and/or outputs. The 
SBM approach improves the additive DEA model (Charnes et al., 1985) by providing a slacks-
based efficiency score rather than a mere efficiency discrimination.  
The general version of the slacks-based manager efficiency index (SMEI) is defined as 
follows. Let us consider a set of n managers, where each manager j (for j=1, 2, 3,…, n) has a set 
of m inputs xij (for i=1,…,m) to produce a set of s outputs yrj (for r=1,…,s). The SMEI assumes 
that xij > 0 and yrj > 0. Under the hypothesis of constant returns to scale (CRS)7, λ is a non-
negative set of variables (λ1,…, λn) that represent the intensity vector, and s- and s+ are the slack 
vectors that represent the non-negative sets of input excesses and output shortfalls, respectively. 
Therefore, the production possibility set P is defined as 
1 1
{( , ) ,    ,    0}n nj j j j jj jP x y x x y yλ λ λ= == ≥ ≤ ≥∑ ∑   (3) 
Considering that ωi and γr are the weights associated with the i-input and the r-output, 
respectively, a target manager, denoted by subscript o, will be considered efficient in terms of 
Pareto–Koopmans when it has no input excesses and no output shortfalls for any optimal 
solution, that is, when SMEIo=1 according to the following model: 
∑
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According to the previously defined variables in sections 2.1 and 2.2, our empirical 
application of Eq. (4) has a set of 3 xij inputs (for i=RISK, TURNOVER, EE) to produce a set of 
2 yrj outputs (for r=RETURN, AUM). In addition, equal weights are considered for inputs and 
outputs, i.e., ωi=1 and γr=1. However, this general model is feasible to consider any weight for 
inputs and outputs. 
                                                          
7 We assume the CRS hypothesis due to the lack of conclusive results in the DEA literature regarding the 
presence of either scale economies or scale diseconomies in the mutual funds market (Basso and Funari, 
2017). However, the consideration of variable returns to scale (VRS) could be easily included in our 
model by adding the convexity condition to the intensity vector λ as suggested by Tone (2001). Thus, the 
restriction 1
1
=∑ =
n
j j
λ  should be included in Eq. (4). 
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The reference-set Ro for the target manager is defined as the set of managers who 
correspond to positive λj* in the solution of the previous model. Thus, Ro are the ‘best practice’ 
competitors who serve as a reference for the target manager.8 
},,1  ,0{ * njjR jo =>= λ  (5) 
2.4 The local SMEI 
Tone (2010) finds that the SBM model may fail to identify the ‘best practice’ 
competitors who can serve as a reference for the target manager due to the striking differences 
between the characteristics of the target managers and the characteristics included in the ‘best 
practice’ frontier. This limitation may question the accuracy of the SMEI results, particularly in 
mutual fund industries where managers show varying characteristics. The level of management 
specialisation is a good example of these differences. For example, the specialist managers who 
are focused on a unique investment category of mutual funds may not be an adequate ‘best 
practice’ reference for a generalist manager focused on a wide range of investment categories, 
although the specialist managers are in the efficient frontier of the SMEI model. 
Tone (2010) proposes four variations of the SBM model. These variants are based on 
the hyperplanes (facets) instead of the vertices of the efficient frontier obtained by the SBM. 
These variants allow a new approach to find the most suitable facets with respect to each target 
manager. Specifically, we follow Variation III to solve the aforementioned problem of non-
appropriate reference frontiers. Variation III could be considered a refinement of the general 
approach of Variation II that evaluates each manager with all possible facets of the reference 
frontier. Variation III consists of the application of Variation II only to the reference frontiers 
formed by competitors with similar characteristics to the target manager. According to Tone 
(2010), Variation III provides more reasonable efficiency scores with less computing effort than 
Variation II because of the exclusion of reference facets formed by competitors with 
heterogeneous management characteristics.   
Therefore, we define the local SMEI as an innovative approach to find locally efficient 
managers with respect to competitors with homogeneous characteristics rather than the globally 
efficient managers obtained by the SMEI (Eq. (4)). The motivation for this new measure is that 
managers with the same characteristics have the same opportunities to achieve efficiency, 
thereby ranking managers more comparably and realistically than other models. The main 
advantage of the local SMEI is the identification of more acceptable reference sets for managers 
                                                          
8 According to the ongoing debate concerning the potential consideration of risk as an undesirable output 
that is jointly produced with return, our SMEI can be complemented by a non-radial and non-oriented 
slacks-based model to obtain an efficiency measure in the presence of undesirable outputs. Cooper et al. 
(2007) address that only non-radial and non-oriented models can capture all aspects of efficiency. 
Appendix A includes the details of this complementary model that could be easily applied when risk is 
considered an undesirable output. 
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because the facets will be formed only by the managers who belong to the same cluster as the 
target manager. Thus, managers must be classified according to unequivocal and relevant 
management criteria to obtain mutually exclusive clusters. 
Following the SBM Variation III of Tone (2010), our local-SMEI approach minimises 
the SMEI score from all clustered facets through four steps. First, all managers are classified in 
C clusters to form homogeneous sets of competitors. Then, we find the set of efficient managers 
by solving the original SMEI (Eq. (4)). After this, we enumerate all facets and select only 
maximal friends. This enumeration process is restricted to the facets formed by managers who 
belong to the same cluster, i.e., managers who can be considered to be real competitors of the 
target manager according to the clustering process. A subset Pj of the CRS-efficient managers in 
the production possibility set P is defined as a friend if a linear combination of the inputs and 
outputs of Pj is also CRS-efficient. A friend Pj is defined as a maximal friend if any addition of 
the CRS-efficient managers (not in the friends) to Pj is not CRS-efficient.9 Finally, the local 
SMEI obtains the efficiency scores (Eq. (6)) for each inefficient manager in reference to each 
maximal friend facet R(h) that comprise only the efficient managers in the same cluster as the 
inefficient manager.  
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Note that our empirical application of Eq. (6) has a set of 3 equally weighted xij inputs 
(for i=RISK, TURNOVER, EE) to produce a set of 2 equally weighted yrj outputs (for 
r=RETURN, AUM). However, additional variables and unequal weights could be considered in 
further extensions of this model.  
                                                          
9 See Definitions 5, 6 and 7 (Tone, 2010) for further details of these subsets of facets. The identification 
of the maximal friends is programmed in an algorithm by Tone (2010), which first obtains the friends. 
Afterwards, this algorithm deletes the friends who are subsets of other friends (i.e., dominated friends). 
Let us illustrate how this algorithm works with the example originally proposed by Tone (2010). Suppose 
that 4 out of 12 DMUs are efficient. The efficient DMUs are A, B, D and L. Suppose that the set of 
friends who comprises two DMUs are found to be [A,D], [B,D], [A,L], [B,L] and [D,L]. Suppose that the 
set of friends who comprise three DMUs are [A,D,L] and [B,D,L]. According to Tone (2010), the set 
[A,B,D,L] cannot be a set of friends. Therefore, the maximal friends are [A,D,L] and [B,D,L] because all 
the friends who comprise two or less DMUs are subsets of the maximal friends who comprise three 
DMUs. Furthermore, we can restrict this algorithm to maximal friends who belong to the same cluster as 
required by our local-SMEI approach. Suppose that A, B, and D are efficient DMUs that belong to cluster 
1, while L is the only efficient DMU that belongs to cluster 2. Thus, the sets [A,D] and [B,D] are the 
maximal friends in cluster 1, and in cluster 2, we have only one maximal friend facet [L]. 
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The local-SMEI score of each inefficient manager is then obtained as the maximum 
Local-SMEIoR(h) obtained for all the maximal friend facets R(h). When the local-SMEI finds no 
feasible solution to the set of maximal friend facets R(h), the target manager is considered to be 
globally inefficient but locally efficient in relation to the managers with common clustering 
characteristics. 
}-{max- )()(
hR
ohRo SMEILocalSMEILocal =  (7) 
Therefore, the local SMEI is convenient to appropriately identify locally efficient 
managers who might be misevaluated by the original SMEI if the referent ‘best practice’ 
managers show very different characteristics than the target managers. 
3. An empirical application to the Spanish mutual fund industry 
We use a sample of managers from the Spanish mutual fund industry to illustrate how 
both the SMEI and the local SMEI work in a real-world problem and how these models can be 
implemented by management companies to define efficiency-based remuneration systems for 
their managers. We choose this market because Spain is one of the most relevant Euro mutual 
fund industries with an important concentration from a management perspective, where small 
and independent management companies coexist with large and bank-owned management 
companies.10 Thus, the heterogeneity of the management units to be analysed emphasises the 
interest in the results of our SMEI proposal. The initial database consists of 189 mutual funds 
registered in Spain that invested in Euro equities during our sample period from 2009-2016. 
This sample is free from survivorship bias because it contains information of both dead and 
surviving funds over the examined sample period. These mutual funds are managed by both 
individual managers and management teams. However, our empirical illustration is focused 
only on the efficiency of individual managers because it is not clear how the different skills of 
single team members translate into the skills of a management team (Bär et al., 2011).11 Thus, 
the final sample comprises 83 distinct mutual funds and 68 distinct individual managers from 
January 2009 to December 2016. Every manager in this final sample has single-managed at 
least one fund for an entire year. There are 57 out of 83 mutual funds that do not change 
managers in our sample period. Therefore, the accumulated effect of fund efficiency due to 
previous managers has a minor impact in our study given that the variables are computed on an 
                                                          
10 As of December 2016, Spain was the fifth largest Euro mutual fund industry in terms of the number of 
funds (Investment Company Institute, 2017). The top 5 and top 10 of the 83 Spanish management 
companies controlled 58% and 78% of the total assets in the industry, respectively (Inverco, 2016). 
11  This analysis is for the purpose of illustration, and the SMEI models can be easily extended to 
management teams when all the information related to the team is available and to different investment 
vocations. 
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annual basis. Thus, it is not necessary to remove the effect of the previous manager when a new 
manager is appointed.12 
Mutual fund information is obtained from the Spanish Securities Exchange Commission 
(CNMV). This dataset includes the return records and the main fund characteristics required in 
our analysis, such as assets under management, custodial and management fees and the 
management company of all mutual funds in the sample. Additionally, manager data are 
obtained from Morningstar Direct. We collect the manager’s name, the date on which the 
manager assumed responsibility for the fund and, in some cases, a brief summary of the 
manager’s career and level of education. This information is complemented by websites such as 
Citywire or LinkedIn, when available. These websites provide additional information on 
managers’ education, career path, gender, etc.  
Table 1 (Panel A) reports the number of managers and mutual funds analysed each year 
and the distribution of these managers according to their level of specialisation. This sample is 
not homogeneous in terms of manager specialisation. The percentage of generalist managers, 
i.e., managers focused on several mutual fund categories, is significantly higher than the 
percentage of specialist managers, i.e., managers in charge of funds in a given investment 
category. This issue will be further discussed in the next section of the empirical analysis. Table 
1 (Panel B) reports the summary statistics of the inputs and outputs used in the SMEI approach. 
The large dispersion of these variables also provides evidence of the heterogeneous 
characteristics of the individual managers included in our sample period. 
 
3.1 Efficiency assessment using the SMEI model 
First, we apply the SMEI (Eq. (4)) to each individual manager and year to obtain the 
minimum score associated with the relative maximum slacks of any input and output from the 
efficient frontier.13 Appendix B shows the detailed distribution of these efficiency scores and 
the reference set for each individual manager during the sample period. Additionally, Appendix 
C shows the efficiency ranking of each individual during the sample period. Table 2 (Panel A) 
displays the descriptive statistics of these efficiency scores for each year and shows that 2009 
and 2013 provide the highest levels of efficiency during the sample period.14 We apply the non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test to examine whether the SMEI scores originate from the same 
distribution. The evidence provided by this test supports that there is a significant difference in 
the distributions of the SMEI scores across years. 
                                                          
12 Further research could examine the accumulated differential effect of current and previous managers.  
13 The SMEI model has also been computed under the hypothesis of variable returns to scale. We find a 
rank correlation between the constant and variable returns to scale assumptions greater than 90%. The 
details are not shown for the sake of brevity, but they are available upon request. 
14 As a robustness check, we examine the correlation between our SMEI scores and the traditional 
performance measure proposed by Sharpe (1996). The rank correlation of both measures is above 23%, 
thereby supporting the differential effect of our SMEI model. 
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Table 1. Description of the sample and variables in the model 
This table summarises the managers’ characteristics and the variables included in the sample from January 2009 to December 2016. Panel A reports the number of managers 
and mutual funds analysed each year and the distribution of these managers according to the level of specialisation. Panel B reports the summary statistics of the inputs-
outputs used in our SMEI model. Specifically, it reports the median and the standard deviation of the normalised value of the weighted annual gross return (Output RETURN), 
the annual assets under management in thousand € (Output AUM), the weighted annual total risk assumed by the manager (Input RISK), the weighted annual manager 
turnover (Input TURNOVER) and the education-experience variable (Input EE). 
Panel A 2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
Mutual Funds 37  56  56  40  43  47  43  48 
Managers 30  41  40  32  34  36  35  39 
    Specialists 10 (33.33%)  12 (29.27%)  13 (32.50%)  10 (31.25%)  11 (32.35%)  12 (33.33%)  12 (34.29%)  17 (43.59%) 
    Generalists 20 (66.67%)  29 (70.73%)  27 (67.50%)  22 (68.75%)  23 (67.65%)  24 (66.67%)  23 (65.71%)  22 (56.41%) 
Panel B Median St. Dev  Median St. Dev  Median St. Dev  Median St. Dev 
 
Median St. Dev  Median St. Dev 
 
Median St. Dev  Median St. Dev 
OUTPUTS    
 
   
 
   
 
     
 
     
RETURN  0.6021 0.2027  0.3570 0.2885  0.6745 0.2172  0.3758 0.2445  0.2665 0.1639  0.6714 0.2205  0.4030 0.2741 
 0.3530 0.1896 
AUM  36,952 71,410  21,138 70,876  18,239 61,228  20,927 51,792  48,219 128,111  70,007 111,091  87,857 207,765  50,943 213,607 
INPUTS                     
   
RISK  0.0123 0.0060  0.0136 0.0075  0.0148 0.0076  0.0128 0.0065  0.0095 0.0048  0.0098 0.0052  0.0119 0.0052 
 0.0131 0.0063 
TURNOVER 0.4071 0.2828  0.3896 0.3302  0.4081 0.2618  0.4361 0.3178  0.3472 0.2703  0.1802 0.1853  0.2200 1.0714 
 0.2700 0.8860 
EE 6.2035 5.4161  4.0027 5.6537  5.2243 5.6974  5.0350 6.0334  6.5129 5.9531  7.0105 6.1617  8.3417 6.2032 
 9.0055 6.0079 
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The complementary extension of the SMEI that uses risk as an undesirable output (see 
Appendix A) provides results similar to our original SMEI model.15 
Table 2 (Panel B) displays the most frequent role model manager found each year. 
According to the definition of these frontiers (Eq. (5)), all the members of these sets are 
efficient, and they are considered to be the ‘best practice’ competitors who serve as role models 
for each evaluated manager. This information is quite relevant because it provides a plan for the 
‘best practice’ managers to follow to gain efficiency. We find that manager 7 is the most 
frequently identified role model in 4 years out of our 8-year sample period and is a member of 
the reference set in another year, too. Note that this ‘star’ manager is a woman with a Business 
Administration degree but without a master’s degree. She is a “senior” manager with several 
years of experience in the Spanish mutual fund industry and works as a generalist manager who 
is simultaneously in charge of several mutual funds of different investment vocations. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics for the SMEI model 
Panel A shows the summary statistics resulting from the SMEI model each year. Panel B shows both the 
components of the most frequent reference frontier each year and its frequency from the total number of 
managers analysed each year. 
Panel A: SMEI scores 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Number of efficient managers 9 6 4 6 11 9 9 8 
Number of managers 30 41 40 32 34 36 35 39 
% of efficient managers 30.00 14.63 10.00 18.75 32.35 25.00 25.71 20.51 
SMEI_mean 0.44 0.20 0.17 0.24 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.30 
SMEI_median 0.23 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.26 0.12 0.13 
SMEI_standard deviation 0.40 0.34 0.29 0.38 0.43 0.38 0.42 0.38 
SMEI_interquartile range 0.91 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.93 0.55 0.87 0.39 
Kruskal Wallis test (p value)  28.54 (1.8exp-04)   
Panel B: Most frequent reference frontier   
Manager IDs in the frontier 39 7 7 7 7-35 7 39 39 
Frequency/Total number of managers 5/30 26/41 36/40 21/32 9/34 18/36 11/35 11/39 
 
The dynamics of the efficiency scores obtained from the SMEI model is worth our 
interest. Although the research on efficiency persistence in mutual funds has been vast since the 
first evidence of Grinblatt and Titman (1992), little attention has been paid to managers’ 
persistence (Pojarliev and Levich, 2010), although this analysis should shed light on the 
                                                          
15 The efficiency rankings between the SMEI model and the SMEI with undesirable outputs (Eq. (A1)) 
are significantly correlated and show an average Spearman rank coefficient higher than 89%. This 
correlation is quite similar to the correlation obtained between the SMEI model and the undesirable and 
non-separable approach (Eq. (A3)). Furthermore, we obtain robust results for a set of 100,000 simulated 
samples of managers for each year of our sample period. The average Spearman rank coefficient is higher 
than 95% between the SMEI and both models included in Appendix A. Thus, the consideration of risk as 
an input or an undesirable output is not relevant in terms of the empirical results obtained by our SMEI 
model. The details regarding both the SMEI with undesirable outputs and the simulation process are 
available upon request. 
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predictability of managers’ efficiency based on the previous SMEI results. Table 3 shows the 
transition probabilities of both efficient and inefficient managers. Overall, we find evidence of 
clear persistent patterns in the SMEI scores, particularly for inefficient managers. That is, 
inefficient managers in year t-1 are likely to remain inefficient in the subsequent year. However, 
the transition probabilities show a striking result when we consider the managers who 
disappeared from our sample, i.e., they are excluded from the industry or they are members of a 
management team rather than individual managers. Table 3 does not clearly show that more 
efficient managers are more likely to persist in our sample than inefficient managers. Thus, are 
there any different patterns between the individual managers who survive during the entire 
period and the individual managers who disappeared from our sample? Table 4 further 
examines this question by analysing the SMEI scores and the variables of the model split by 
managers’ survivorship in our sample period. 
 
Table 3. Transition probabilities of managers 
Panel A shows the probability of an efficient manager transitioning from a maximum SMEI score in year 
t-1 to both an efficient or inefficient SMEI score in year t. This panel also presents the probability of an 
efficient manager in year t-1 not working as an individual manager in year t (disappearing manager). 
Panel B reports the same transition probabilities for inefficient managers.  
 Panel A: Transition probabilities for efficient managers 
 
2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015   2015-2016 
Efficient t-1 → Efficient t 22.2% 66.7% 50.0% 66.7% 54.5% 44.5% 55.6% 
Efficient t-1 → Inefficient t 77.8% 33.3%   0.0% 16.6% 36.4% 33.3% 44.4% 
Efficient t-1 → Disappearing t   0.0%   0.0% 50.0% 16.6%   9.1%  22.2%   0.0% 
 Panel B: Transition probabilities for inefficient managers 
Inefficient t-1 → Efficient t   4.7%   0.0%   5.6% 15.4%   4.3% 7.4% 7.7% 
Inefficient t-1 → Inefficient t 85.8% 94.3% 69.4% 76.9% 91.3% 59.3% 84.6% 
Inefficient t-1 → Disappearing t   9.5%   5.7% 25.0%   7.7%   4.4% 33.3% 7.7% 
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney test that applied to the SMEI scores provided in 
Table 4 does not reject the null hypothesis that for the entire period, the SMEI scores of 
managers and the remaining managers come from identical populations, i.e., efficiency seems to 
be significantly irrelevant in determining the survivorship of an individual manager across the 
entire sample period in the Spanish industry, thereby strengthening the previous evidence 
reported in Table 3. To deepen the understanding of this issue, we also apply the Mann-Whitney 
test to the set of inputs and outputs of the model. The results of this non-parametric test of the 
SMEI variables support that both the assets under management and the education-experience of 
managers are the only variables that may significantly determine the survivorship of an 
individual manager. More assets and education-experience help managers to keep their jobs as 
individual managers. In contrast, returns, risk and turnover for the entire period are not 
significantly different between managers and the remaining managers.  
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Table 4. SMEI scores and variables divided by managers’ survivorship 
This table shows the mean of the SMEI scores and SMEI variables (inputs and outputs) across the entire 
sample period for the individual managers who survived all the years of our sample period (entire period 
managers) and the managers who did not remain individual managers during the entire sample period 
(remaining managers).  
 SMEI score RETURN AUM RISK TURNOVER EE 
Entire-period Managers 0.267 0.471 111,185 0.010 0.509 10.95 
Remaining Managers 0.327 0.483 60,488 0.010 0.402   6.12 
Mann-Whitney test (p value) 9,842(0.628)  9,609(0.891) 6,649(0.000)  9,741(0.739)   8,417(0.104) 4,242(0.000) 
 
3.2 Locally efficient managers 
We create two clusters in our sample to illustrate how the local SMEI (Eq. (7)) works in 
a real-world problem. We choose the manager’s level of specialisation to form these clusters. 
Specifically, we calculate the number of funds managed by each individual manager each year. 
Then, we compute the number of investment vocations in which the manager is working each 
year. If all the mutual funds correspond to a single investment vocation, this manager is 
considered a specialist. Otherwise, the manager is considered a generalist. Our choice of these 
clusters is justified by the recent evidence that supports the relevance of managers’ 
specialisation for management companies to optimally allocate managers. Fang et al. (2014) 
address that companies assign managers to market segments depending on their management 
skills. Zambrana and Zapatero (2017) also find that it is optimal to allocate managers with 
market timing skills to generalist responsibilities and managers with stock-picking skills to 
specialist duties.  
Table 5 reports both the number of managers included in each cluster and the number of 
efficient managers that result from the SMEI model according to the previously defined level of 
specialisation. Overall, Table 5 shows that the percentage of efficient managers included in the 
cluster specialist (S) is mostly higher than the percentage of efficient managers in the cluster 
generalist (G) for the entire sample period. 
 
Table 5. Clusters based on the manager’s level of specialisation 
This table shows the number of SMEI-efficient managers each year according to the manager’s 
specialisation. The number of managers included in the cluster specialist (S) and in the cluster generalist 
(G) is denoted in parentheses. 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
SMEI-efficient specialists (Cluster S) 5 (10) 2 (12) 1 (13) 3 (10) 5 (11) 3 (12) 5 (12) 4 (17) 
SMEI-efficient generalists (Cluster G) 4 (20) 4 (29) 3 (27) 3 (22) 6 (23) 6 (24) 4 (23) 4 (22) 
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As outlined in section 2.4, all the combinations of both efficient generalist and 
specialised managers within each cluster and for each year should be enumerated. Table 6 
shows the number of facets, friends’ facets and maximal friends’ facets for the two clusters S 
and G in our sample period. Note that the clusters with the greatest number of facets are the 
clusters of generalist managers in 2013 and 2014, with 63 total facets. This set of facets enables 
us to enumerate 27 and 23 friends in the generalist cluster, respectively, to finally obtain 3 
maximal friends, which are not dominated by any other set of friends.16 
 
Table 6. Facets, friends and maximal friends per cluster and year 
This table summarises the total number of facets, friends’ facets and maximal friends’ facets obtained 
from the clustering process depending on the manager’s level of specialisation.  
Panel A 
Specialist Managers (S) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Number of Facets 31 3 1 7 31 7 31 15 
Number of Friends 19 3 1 4 9 4 17 10 
Number of Maximal friends 2 1 1 2 4 2 2 2 
Panel B 
Generalist Managers (G)         
Number of Facets 15 15 7 7 63 63 15 15 
Number of Friends 6 9 4 7 27 23 4 9 
Number of Maximal friends 3 2 2 1 3 3 4 2 
 
The results of the local-SMEI model conducted to evaluate managers’ efficiency 
according to their level of specialisation are reported in Table 7. Specifically, Panel A shows the 
distribution of the local-SMEI efficiency scores (Eq. (7)) for specialist managers, and Panel B 
shows the corresponding scores for generalist managers. When the local-SMEI model finds no 
feasible solution to the set of maximal friends within the same cluster, the target manager is 
considered to be globally inefficient but locally efficient in relation to the managers with 
common clustering characteristics, namely, specialist and generalist, in this case. 
According to Tone (2010), one of the main merits of this variation is that the efficiency 
score is obtained in reference to the efficient competitors in the same cluster. Thus, the results 
are more acceptable and understandable. However, Tone (2010) also concludes that applications 
to real-world problems are necessary to check for the consistency of the SBM variations. Our 
paper contributes to this enquiry with a real application to mutual fund markets.  
Table 7 shows some interesting findings to consider regarding this issue. First, because 
of the construction of the local-SMEI model, we find that this variation improves the efficiency 
results obtained by the SMEI model in the previous section. This finding was already 
                                                          
16 Tone (2010) emphasises that SBM Variation III is a relevant contribution to reduce the computational 
resources required for large-scale problems involving a massive enumeration of facets. 
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considered theoretically by Tone (2010), and it accords with the definition of more appropriate 
reference frontiers within the same cluster that help in the identification of locally efficient 
managers. However, Table 7 finds a striking result in 2011 because all specialist managers are 
considered locally efficient. Note that there is only one globally efficient manager in this cluster. 
Thus, this result casts doubt on the general application of this variation.  
Let us focus on 2011 to deepen our understanding of this problem. Only 1 of the 4 
globally efficient managers that were found in 2011 by the SMEI model was a specialist, i.e., 
manager ID 1. Thus, according to this globally efficient specialist, there was only one facet 
formed by this manager, and this one-manager facet was the only friend and maximal friend to 
act as the reference frontier for the remaining specialist managers in the application of the local-
SMEI. The problem arises when the local-SMEI finds no feasible solution to this sole manager 
maximal friend frontier. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the average SMEI scores based on the global frontier 
(Appendix B) of the locally efficient managers reported in Table 7 can reveal which group of 
managers, i.e., specialists or generalists, are adversely affected the most by using the global 
frontier. In our empirical illustration, we find that locally efficient specialist managers decrease 
their efficiency scores the most when using the global reference frontier.17 This result would 
especially justify the use of the local SMEI model in the specialist cluster to obtain accurate 
results considering homogeneous reference competitors.   
According to Tone (2010), Table 7 provides more acceptable results in terms of the 
evaluation of the efficiency of managers with similar characteristics because these results are 
obtained in reference to the efficient managers in the same cluster. In addition, the sample split 
divided into different clusters helps to reduce excessive enumeration of maximal friends 
required by this model. However, our empirical application finds that this variation may fail to 
properly evaluate efficiency for small clusters with only one globally efficient manager. 
Alternatives such as picking the globally efficient managers in the adjacent clusters to form the 
maximal friends (Tone, 2010) are not appropriate when there are only two excluding clusters, 
i.e., specialists (S) and generalists (G).  
 
  
                                                          
17 Locally efficient managers in the specialist cluster obtain an average SMEI=0.186 per year based on the 
global frontier, while locally efficient managers in the generalist cluster obtain a yearly average 
SMEI=0.219. 
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Table 7. Managers’ efficiency depending on their level of specialisation 
This table shows the distribution of the local-SMEI efficiency scores according to their level of 
specialisation. Managers are classified as specialists into cluster S if they manage mutual funds on just 
one investment objective, while managers are classified as generalists into cluster G if they manage 
mutual funds with several investment objectives. Panel A shows the distribution of the local-SMEI 
efficiency scores for specialist managers, and Panel B shows the corresponding local-efficiency scores for 
generalist managers. When this model finds no feasible solution to the maximal friends within the same 
cluster, the target manager is considered to be globally inefficient but locally efficient in relation to the 
managers with common clustering characteristics – in this case, specialists and generalists. 
* shows Manager IDs who were considered Specialists in some years and Generalists in other years. 
Panel A 
Specialists (S) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1 1 Loc. Effic 1 1 1 1 1   
  4*       0.126 0.186 
6    0.272 0.116 1 Loc. Effic   
8 0.640 0.283 1 Loc. Effic 0.255 5.6exp-05 2.1exp-05 0.001 0.001 
9  1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic 0.217 1 Loc. Effic 0.143 0.067 
10 1 Loc. Effic 0.397 1 Loc. Effic 0.317 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic 0.147 1 Loc. Effic 
11 1 0.109 1 Loc. Effic      
14 1 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic 1 1 Loc. Effic 0.521 0.406 
17  0.226 1 Loc. Effic 0.278     
20 0.092 0.106 1 Loc. Effic      
25 1 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic      
  29*       1 1 
  33*        0.139 
34      1 Loc. Effic   
35 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic  1    
37      1 1 0.603 
39 1 1 1 Loc. Effic 1 1 1 1 1 
41    1 1 0.337   
42 1 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic      
43     0.420 0.183   
45   1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic   
55       0.207 0.111 
56       1 1 
58       1 0.447 
62       0.172 0.239 
64        0.128 
65        0.174 
67        0.175 
68         1 
Mean Cluster (S) 0.873 0.677 1.0000 0.712 0.705 0.793 0.526 0.502 
St. Dev. Cluster (S) 0.297 0.406 0.000 0.372 0.421 0.381 0.434 0.409 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
Panel B 
Generalists (G) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
2 1 1 1 
   
  
3 0.386 0.320 0.316  0.593 0.537 0.213 0.239 
  4* 1 0.420 0.404 0.447 0.646 0.595   
5 1 1 Loc. Effic 0.132 
   
  
7 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 Loc. Effic 1 
12 0.225 0.098 0.130 0.129 1 Loc. Effic 0.534 1 1 
13 0.368 0.298 0.413 0.360 0.525 0.702 1 Loc. Effic 0.514 
15 1 Loc. Effic 0.303 0.431 0.276 0.453 0.382   
16 
 
0.504 0.290 0.041 1 Loc. Effic 0.696 1 Loc. Effic 0.554 
18 0.193 0.292 0.507 0.246 0.505 0.286 0.199 1 Loc. Effic 
19 1 Loc. Effic   2.2exp-04 0.145 0.310 0.716 0.476 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic 
21 1 Loc. Effic 0.670       
22  0.448 0.333 0.229 1 0.923   
23 
     
1 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic 
24 
 
0.291 
    
  
26 0.509 0.333 0.115 
   
  
27 
 
0.133 0.120 0.129 1 1 1 1 
28 0.247 0.240 0.201 0.433 0.684 0.482 0.287 0.339 
  29* 0.353 0.664 0.398 0.517 1 1   
30 
    
1 1 0.099  
31 0.070 0.050 0.124 0.373 0.736 1   
32 1 Loc. Effic 0.362 0.557 0.388 0.339 0.427   
  33* 1 Loc. Effic        
36  0.659 1.2exp-04 1     
38      1 Loc. Effic   
40 3.8exp-05        
44  0.732 0.617 0.321     
46    1 0.687 0.530 1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic 
47  0.510 0.457 0.223 0.175 0.088 0.085 1 Loc. Effic 
48  1 1      
49  1 0.081 0.161 0.432 0.461 1 Loc. Effic 1 
50  0.268 0.516 0.415 0.822  1 Loc. Effic 1 Loc. Effic 
51 0.277 0.558 0.155      
52     1 0.563 1 Loc. Effic 0.29 
53 1 Loc. Effic 0.246 0.490 9.2exp-05 0.434 0.518 0.082 0.182 
54 1 0.602 0.411 0.109 0.637 0.509 1 0.551 
57       0.052 0.223 
59       1 1 Loc. Effic 
60       0.176 0.455 
61       1 Loc. Effic  
63       0.199 1 Loc. Effic 
66        1 Loc. Effic 
Mean Cluster (G) 0.631 0.483 0.383 0.369 0.712 0.655 0.669 0.731 
St. Dev. Cluster (G) 0.392 0.304 0.278 0.290 0.255 0.271 0.424 0.329 
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4. Concluding remarks 
Our paper contributes to filling the literature gap caused by the lack of DEA evidence 
on the efficiency of mutual fund managers. We reformulate the founding DPEI (Murthi et al., 
1997) to develop a slacks-based manager efficiency index (SMEI) that may support efficiency-
based decisions of fund companies regarding individual managers. Our SMEI model presents 
three main contributions to the appropriate evaluation of managers. First, our SMEI model 
evaluates the efficiency of managers in their entirety instead of focusing on individual mutual 
funds. Second, our SMEI model includes socio-demographic variables, such as managers' 
education and experience, to extend the mere consideration of portfolio results in the model. 
Third, according to Tone (2010), we propose our variation of the SMEI model to identify 
locally efficient managers in reference to the ‘best practice’ competitors with similar 
management characteristics. 
We illustrate how the SMEI model works in a complete sample of individual managers 
in the Spanish mutual fund market. This illustration further examines the persistence of the 
efficiency scores resulting from the SMEI model and how the SMEI variables significantly 
influence the survivorship of individual managers. Finally, the local SMEI identifies locally 
efficient but globally inefficient managers according to the level of management specialisation. 
However, the results cast doubt on the general application of this local variant for small and 
excluding clusters. Further research should include not only SMEI extensions to deepen the 
understanding of managers’ efficiency but also real applications to other mutual fund industries. 
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Appendix A. SBM with undesirable outputs.  
The slacks-based measure with undesirable outputs is defined as follows. Let us 
consider a set of n decision-making units (DMUs), where each DMU j (for j=1, 2, 3,…, n) has a 
set of 3 factors, namely, inputs, good outputs and undesirable (bad) outputs, as represented by 
the three vectors of x ∈ Rm, yg ∈ Rs1 and yb ∈ Rs2, respectively. The matrices X, Yg and Yb are 
defined as follows: X=(x1,…,xn)∈ Rm x n, Yg=(yg1,…, ygn)∈ Rs1 x n and Yb=(yb1,…, ybn)∈ Rs2 x n. We 
assume that X > 0, Yg>0 and Yb>0. Under the hypothesis of constant returns to scale (CRS), λ is 
a non-negative set of variables (λ1,…, λn) that represents the intensity vector; s-∈ Rm and sb ∈ Rs2 
are the slack vectors that represent the non-negative sets of input and bad output excesses, 
respectively, while sg∈ Rs1 is the slack vector that represents good output shortfalls. Therefore, 
the production possibility set P is defined as 
1 1 1
{( , , )  ,     ,    ,    0}n n ng b g g b bj j j j j j jj j jP x y y x x y y y yλ λ λ λ= = == ≥ ≤ ≥ ≥∑ ∑ ∑  (A1) 
A target manager will be considered efficient in terms of Pareto–Koopmans when 
he/she has no slacks for any optimal solution, that is, when SBM–Undesirable=1 according to 
the following model: 
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For the specific case that risk is considered to be an undesirable output but is jointly 
produced by return, then the weak disposability of outputs should hold. This weak disposability 
bounds the size of P in the yb direction. Therefore, the new production possibility set P should 
be defined as 
1 1 1
{( , , )  ,     ,    ,    0}n n ng b g g b bj j j j j j jj j jP x y y x x y y y yλ λ λ λ= = == ≥ ≤ = ≥∑ ∑ ∑  (A3) 
This boundedness property involves that there are no slacks srb in the undesirable output 
constraint so the denominator of the objective function of Eq. (A2) will change to incorporate 
this non-separable condition of risk and return. 
Furthermore, the aforementioned models can be generalised when certain bad outputs 
are not separable from the corresponding good outputs and certain inputs. For further details, 
see the NS-Overall model proposed in section 13.3 of Cooper et al. (2007). 
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Appendix B 
This appendix shows the distribution of the managers’ efficiency scores during the sample period (2009-2016). The first column of the table shows a manager ID to maintain 
anonymity. Then, for each year, the table shows the SMEI scores (Eq. (4)) and the reference frontier. 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Manager ID SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. 
1 0.430 2,4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - - - 
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 - - - - - - - - - - 
3 0.128 39 0.021 7 0.029 7 - - 0.124 7,35 0.145 7 0.036 39 0.025 39 
4 1 4 0.184 7 0.074 7 0.076 7 0.146 7,35 0.231 7 0.031 39 0.145 39 
5 1 5 0.117 7,39 0.079 7 - - - - - - - - - - 
6 - - - - - - 0.027 7 0.053 7,35 0.542 7 - - - - 
7 - - 1 7,39 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 0.337 39 1 7 
8 0.077 39 0.035 7 0.030 7 0.033 7 0.000 7,27 0.000 7,27 0.000 39,56 0.000 68 
9 - - 0.025 7,49 0.028 7 0.035 7,46 0.031 7,35 0.033 7 0.009 39 0.009 39 
10 0.420 2,4,39 0.139 7 0.203 7 0.064 7 0.074 7,35 0.253 7 0.120 39 0.135 7,39 
11 1 11 0.025 7,48 0.323 7,48 - - - - - - - - - - 
12 0.128 2,4,42 0.075 7 0.108 7 0.100 7 0.109 35 0.299 7,31 1 12 1 12 
13 0.128 4,39,42 0.043 7 0.034 7 0.043 7 0.039 35 0.096 7 0.291 29 0.155 56 
14 1 14 0.172 7,48 0.152 7 0.168 7 1 14 0.361 1,23,29 0.244 29 0.341 56 
15 0.553 2,14 0.067 7 0.053 7 0.027 7 0.047 29,35 0.020 7 - - - - 
16 - - 0.006 7 0.007 7 0.007 7 0.063 7,35 0.272 7 0.131 39 0.116 39 
17 - - 0.053 7 0.056 7 0.045 7 - - - - - - - - 
18 0.063 2 0.018 7 0.021 7 0.010 7 0.015 35 0.051 29 0.054 29 0.099 56 
19 0.613 4,5,39 0.000 39 0.095 7 0.059 7 0.372 7,35 0.385 7 0.329 39,56 0.311 56,68 
20 0.044 2,4,14,42 0.005 7 0.005 7 - - - - - - - - - - 
21 0.237 11,42 0.036 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
22 - - 0.156 7 0.224 7 0.133 7 1 22 0.446 7,27 - - - - 
23 - - - - - - - - - - 1 23 0.025 29,54 0.275 56 
24 - - 0.066 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
25 1 25 0.017 7,49 0.023 7 - - - - - - - - - - 
26 0.031 39 0.008 7 0.011 7 - - - - - - - - - - 
27 - - 0.115 7 0.114 7 0.107 7 1 27 1 27 1 27 1 27 
28 0.046 39,42 0.004 7 0.011 7 0.014 7 0.076 7,35 0.109 7 0.037 39 0.018 39 
29 0.079 39 0.022 7 0.028 7 0.034 7 1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29 
30 - - - - - - - - 1 30 1 30 0.045 39,56 - - 
31 0.010 39,42 0.009 7 0.022 7 0.027 7 0.161 35 1 31 - - - - 
32 0.362 4,11,14,42 0.069 7 0.088 7 0.087 7 0.071 35 0.067 7 -   - -  -  
33 0.127 11,25,39,54 - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.017 39 
34 - - - - - - - - - - 0.133 7,37 - - - - 
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Appendix B (Continued) 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Manager ID SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. SMEI Ref. 
35 0.229 4,39,42 0.066 7 0.070 7 - - 1 35 - - - - - - 
36 - - 0.100 7,48,49 0.000 7 1 36 - - - - - - - - 
37 - - - - - - - - - - 1 37 1 37 0.481 56 
38 - - - - - - - - - - 0.323 37 - - - - 
39 1 39 1 39 0.412 7 1 39 1 39 1 39 1 39 1 39 
40 0.000 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
41 - - - - - - 1 41 1 41 0.282 37 - - - - 
42 1 42 0.196 7 0.141 7 - - - - - - - - - - 
43 - - - - - - - - 0.102 7,19 0.083 7 - - - - 
44 - - 0.124 7,49 0.039 7 0.169 7,36,46 - - - - - - - - 
45 - - - - 0.029 7 0.072 7,46 0.258 7,19 0.388 7 - - - - 
46 - - - - - - 1 46 0.241 7,30,52 0.113 7,37 0.191 37,39,56 0.053 39,68 
47 - - 0.022 7,49 0.011 7 0.012 7 0.021 7,19 0.014 7 0.003 39 0.005 39,68 
48 - - 1 48 1 48 - - - - - - - - - - 
49 - - 1 49 0.035 7 0.037 7,46 0.033 35 0.042 7 0.001 39,56 1  
50 - - 0.059 7 0.067 7 0.158 7 0.743 7,19 - - 0.807 29,56 0.526 39,68 
51 0.163 14,42 0.027 7 0.079 7 - - - - - - - - - - 
52 - - - - - - - - 1 52 0.230 7 0.076 39 0.074 39 
53 0.230 4,11,39,42 0.032 7 0.025 7 0.000 7,46 0.070 7,35 0.126 7 0.022 39 0.022 39 
54 1 54 0.019 7 0.020 7 0.028 7,46 0.090 7,19 0.070 7 1 54 0.047 39 
55             0.013 39,56 0.014 39,68 
56             1 56 1 56 
57             0.015 39 0.013 39 
58             1 58 0.191 68 
59             1 59 0.277 68 
60             0.050 29 0.034 39,56 
61             0.184 39,59 - - 
62             0.053 39,56,59 0.196 56 
63             0.069 29 0.127 56 
64             - - 0.024 39 
65             - - 0.052 39,68 
66             - - 0.008 56 
67             - - 0.090 39,68 
68             - - 1 68 
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Appendix C 
This appendix shows the efficiency ranking for each individual manager during the sample period (2009-2016).  
Manager ID 2009   2010   2011   2012   2013   2014   2015   2016   Manager ID 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1 12  1  1  1  1  1  
- 
 
- 
 
35 17 19 18 - 1 - - - 
2 1  1  1  -  -  -  
- 
 
- 
 
36 - 15 40 1 - - - - 
3 19  32  27  -  18  22  
26 
 
29 
 
37 - - - - - 1 1 10 
4 1  8  17  14  17  20  
27 
 
18 
 
38 - - - - - 15 - - 
5 1  13  15  -  -  -  
- 
 
- 
 
39 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 
6 -  -  -  26  27  10  
- 
 
- 
 
40 30 - - - - - - - 
7 -  1  1  1  1  1  
11 
 
1 
 
41 - - - 1 1 17 - - 
8 24  25  25  23  34  36  
35 
 
39 
 
42 1 7 10 - - - - - 
9 -  28  28  21  31  33  
32 
 
36 
 
43 - - - - 20 28 - - 
10 13  11  8  16  23  19  
18 
 
19 
 
44 - 12 22 7 - - - - 
11 1  29  6  -  -  -  
- - 
 
45 - - 26 15 14 12 - - 
12 20  16  12  12  19  16  
1 
 
1 
 
46 - - - 1 15 25 15 25 
13 21  23  24  19  29  27  
13 
 
17 
 
47 - 31 35 29 32 35 33 38 
14 1  9  9  8  1  14  
14 
 
11 
 
48 - 1 1 - - - - - 
15 11  18  21  27  28  34  
- 
 
- 
 
49 - 1 23 20 30 32 34 1 
16 -  38  38  31  26  18  
17 
 
21 
 
50 - 21 19 9 12 - 10 9 
17 -  22  20  18  -  -  
- 
 
- 
 
51 18 27 16 - - - - - 
18 25  34  33  30  33  31  
21 
 
22 
 
52 - - - - 1 21 19 24 
19 10  41  13  17  13  13  
12 
 
12 
 
53 16 26 30 32 25 24 29 31 
20 27  39  39  -  -  -  -  
- 
 
54 1 33 34 24 21 29 1 27 
21 15  24  -  -  -  -  -  
- 
 
55 
      
31 34 
22 -  10  7  10  1  11  -  
- 
 
56 
      
1 1 
23 -  -  -  -  -  1  
28 
 
14 
 
57 
      
30 35 
24 -  20  -  -  -  -  -  
- 
 
58 
      
1 16 
25 1  35  31  -  -  -  -  
- 
 
59 
      
1 13 
26 28  37  37  -  -  -  -  
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